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Abstract
We analyze whether a consumer driven health care plan like the newly established Health
Savings Accounts (HSAs) can reduce health care expenditures in the United States and
increase the fraction of the population with health insurance. Unlike previous literature, our
analysis relies on a dynamic general equilibrium framework with heterogenous agents. We
endogenize health care expenditure and insurance choice, so that the model fully accounts
for feedback eﬀects from both factor markets and insurance markets. We then highlight
the importance of including general equilibrium eﬀects into the policy analysis. Speciﬁcally,
our results from numerical simulations indicate that the success of HSAs depends critically
on the productivity of health and the annual contribution limit to HSAs. In addition, we
ﬁnd that taxpayers can face substantial costs when HSAs are introduced to insure more
people and to curb aggregate health expenditures.
JEL: H51, I18, I38
Keywords: Health Savings Accounts, Consumer Driven Health Care Plans, Health
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Numerical Simulation of Health Care Reform
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11 Introduction
In 2003 about 250 million Americans became eligible to save tax free for their health care
expenses in Health Savings Accounts (HSAs) via the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement,
and Modernization Act. HSAs were introduced with two main goals in mind. The ﬁrst goal
was to control the rise in health expenditures, and the second goal was to increase the number
of Americans with health insurance.
Can HSAs deliver on these goals? Evidence is sparse, and the discussion has become increas-
ingly polemic. Proponents of HSAs hail consumer driven health care plans as the panacea to
the health care problem in the United States (Goodman (2004)1), whereas opponents discredit
the idea as “more tax cuts for the rich” (Burman and Blumberg (2003)).2
Since data is sparse, research on HSAs has focused on micro-simulations and partial equilib-
rium models (e.g. Keeler, Malkin, Goldman and Buchanan (1996), Ozanna (1996), Zabinski,
Selden, Moeller and Banthin (1999), Pauly and Herring (2000), and Cardon and Showalter
(2007)) and concentrated on moral hazard and adverse selection of the insurance component of
HSAs.3 This literature is inconclusive as to whether HSAs will decrease total health expendit-
ures. Estimates range from decreases in total health expenditures of 8% to increases in total
health expenditures of 1%. Insurance coverage issues have been addressed in GAO (2006) and
Greene, Hibbard, Dixon and Tusler (2006). Their results seem to indicate that healthier and
higher income households will be more likely to save in HSAs.
While there is an emerging empirical literature on the eﬀects of HSAs, we ﬁnd a paucity
of economic models that address the macroeconomic implications of reforming the U.S. health
care system with HSAs. In this paper we argue that the eﬀects of HSAs should be analyzed in a
general equilibrium framework for several reasons. First, a HSA is a tax-favored savings account
with the potential to induce agents to save more (see Imrohoroglu, Imrohoroglu and Joines
(1998)). The general equilibrium framework fully accounts for changes in capital accumulation,
the market wage rate, interest rates, as well as changes in income. The latter will have impacts
on the demands for health insurance and medical services. We call this the savings eﬀect.
Second, the introduction of HSAs will aﬀect the investment into the production of health. If
health is associated with labor productivity and spending on health is an investment as argued
in Grossman (1972b), human capital formation will be aﬀected. Changes in human capital will
also inﬂuence market prices, individual incomes and the respective demands for health insurance
and medical services. We call this the human capital eﬀect. These economic mechanisms arise
naturally in the general equilibrium framework and have therefore been unexplored by the
empirical literature and the literature concentrating on partial equilibrium models. In this
paper we explore the economic mechanism underlying HSAs and to what extent these two
general equilibrium channels determine whether or not HSAs can deliver on their goals.
To that end, we use a dynamic general equilibrium overlapping generations model that
includes the following features. First, we introduce health as a consumption and investment
good and explicitly model the health production process. Second, we incorporate individual
insurance choices and private and public health insurance markets. We then model the most
important institutional features of HSAs.4 This framework allows us to make statements about
1Compare also the publications of the National Center for Policy Analysis (NCPA) at
http://www.ncpa.org/pub/ba/ba464/
2See also the more critical views in Hsiao (1995), Hsiao (2001) and Barr (2001).
3Four countries have implemented HSAs so far — Singapore, South Africa, China (experimental stage), and
the United States. We present a brief summary of the literature on HSAs in these countries in Appendix B,
which is available on the authors’ website at: http://pages.towson.edu/jjung/papers/hsa_appendixB.pdf
4Macroeconomic frameworks that model tax sheltered savings accounts or endogenous health capital forma-
tion, but not both, include Hubbard, Skinner and Zeldes (1995), Imrohoroglu, Imrohoroglu and Joines (1998),
2endogenous health insurance choices, the formation of health insurance premiums, and aggreg-
ate spending on health. In addition, it allows us to study the general equilibrium eﬀects of
physical capital accumulation and human capital formation. Our model also explicitly accounts
for general equilibrium eﬀects from price changes in factor markets and insurance markets on
savings and health care expenditures.
The model predicts that the success of HSAs depends critically on the productivity of
health, which governs the human capital eﬀect, and the annual contribution limit to HSAs,
which governs the savings eﬀect. HSAs create two opposing eﬀects on the accumulation of
production factors and output. Depending on the relative strength of these two eﬀects, we
can either observe a decrease or an increase in output, which translates into a decrease or an
increase in household income. If the income eﬀect is negative enough, some agents will decide
to opt out of buying health insurance and therefore demand fewer health services. Aggregate
spending on health will then decline. If, on the other hand, the income eﬀect is positive enough,
more agents will start buying health insurance and consequently demand more health services.
In that case aggregate spending on health increases.
The details of the economic mechanism in the model can be described as follows: (i) the
introduction of HSAs make high deductible health insurances more attractive to households,
(ii) high deductible health insurances increase the eﬀective price of medical services for holders
of such a policy so that the demand for health services decreases, (iii) lower demand for
medical services decreases the health levels of households, (iv) if health is not productive in
the formation of human capital, then human capital will be unaﬀected by changes in medical
spending; if, on the other hand, health is a productive factor in the formation of human
capital, then human capital will decrease as a result of reduced spending on health care, (v)
physical capital increases due to the tax free savings in HSAs, (vi) the net eﬀect of (iv) and
(v) determines whether output increases or decreases, ﬁnally (vii) depending on the income
eﬀect from aggregate output, either a larger or a smaller number of households buys health
insurance.
In our policy experiments, we ﬁrst shut down the human capital eﬀect assuming that health
is unproductive so that we can isolate the savings eﬀect. We calibrate this version of the model
to the U.S. economy and then introduce HSAs into this framework. We ﬁnd that the positive
savings eﬀect does not allow for a reduction of total health expenditure in the economy. If we
increase the annual savings limit in HSAs, we ﬁnd that more people will buy health insurance
and spending for health care increases. Next, we phase in the human capital eﬀect into the
model by allowing health to play a productive role in the model. We ﬁnd that if health becomes
more productive, the positive savings eﬀect from HSAs is counterbalanced by a negative human
capital eﬀect. The equilibrium outcome is that people spend less on health care due to the
high deductible insurances that come with HSAs. We are able to identify the range of health
productivity where HSAs decrease aggregate health expenditure and increase the fraction of
people with health insurance. If, however, health is “very” productive, then the negative human
capital eﬀect outweighs the positive savings eﬀect, so that agents end up with lower income.
The latter leads to fewer people buying health insurance, so that HSAs only deliver on the ﬁrst
goal of decreasing aggregate spending on health.
Finally, we ﬁnd that the price the government has to pay for insuring more people and
curbing total health expenditure with HSAs, can be substantial. After introducing HSAs, the
government has to raise up to 3% of GDP in additional tax revenue in order to ﬁnance the old
level of government consumption.
Palumbo (1999), Jeske and Kitao (2005), and Suen (2006). Models addressing the eﬀects of Medicare on labor
supply, retirement decisions, and moral hazard include Rust and Phelan (1997), Gilleskie (1998), French and
Jones (2004), Khwaja (2002), and Khwaja (2006).
3Our key contribution to the literature is to show the importance of the general equilibrium
eﬀects in determining whether or not the introduction of HSAs are able to deliver on their goals.
We are also able to identify substantial diﬀerences between partial equilibrium outcomes and
general equilibrium outcomes. In addition, our paper is the ﬁrst attempt to incorporate health
insurance choice and endogenous health spending in an overlapping generations framework.
Our results carry policy implications. That is, a meaningful policy analysis must consider the
general equilibrium eﬀects of HSAs before drawing conclusions about the potential success or
failure of HSAs in reducing total health expenditure and increasing the number of insured
individuals.
In the next section, we describe the institutional details of HSAs. In section 3 we introduce
our model and deﬁne the equilibrium. We address the calibration of the benchmark economy
without HSAs in section 4. The results of our policy experiment are described in section 5. We
conclude our ﬁndings in section 6. Appendix A contains all tables and ﬁgures. Appendix B
contains a brief history of HSAs in the U.S. and describes the experience of Singapore, China,
and South Africa with HSAs. Furthermore, Appendix B discusses the solution algorithm,
explains the estimation technique for health shock transition probabilities, and summarized
additional results from our policy experiments.5
2 Health Savings Accounts
An HSA is similar to a Flexible Spending Account (FSA), Health Reimbursement Account
(HRA), Individual Retirement Account (IRA), or 401(k) in the sense that funds are deposited
into the account out of pretax income and interest accumulates tax free. HSAs can only be
established in conjunction with a qualiﬁed High Deductible Health Plan (HDHP). A qualiﬁed
HDHP must have at least a $1,100 deductible for an individual ($2,200 for a family). Any
individual who is covered by an HDHP, not covered by other health insurance, not enrolled in
Medicare, and not claimed as a dependent on someone else’s tax return is eligible for an HSA.
Contributions can be made by either the employer, the employee, or both, but the HSA is
owned by the employee. The maximum annual contribution is $2,850 for an individual ($5,650
for a family). Distribution of the funds is tax-free if taken for “qualiﬁed medical expenses”
(which now includes over-the-counter drugs). Unused funds are rolled over at the end of the
year. Currently, funds cannot be used tax-free to pay premiums of health insurance with
some exceptions. Funds withdrawn for non-medical purposes are subject to a 10% penalty tax
(except in cases of death, disability, or Medicare eligibility) and regular income tax. After the
account holder turns 65, the 10% tax penalty no longer applies. In case of death the HSA can
be transferred tax-free to a spouse.6
3 The Model
3.1 Demographics
We use an overlapping generations framework. Agents work for J1 periods and then retire for
J −J1 periods. In each period there is an exogenous survival probability of cohort j which we
denote πj. Agents die for sure after J periods. Deceased agents leave an accidental bequest
that is taxed and redistributed equally to all agents alive. The population grows exogenously
at an annual net rate n. We assume stable demographic patterns, so that similar to Huggett
5Appendix B is available on the authors’ website at: http://pages.towson.edu/jjung/papers/hsa_appendixB.pdf
6Appendix B contains all institutional details of HSAs and the important diﬀerences to the alternative forms
of tax sheltered savings.
4(1996), age j agents make up a constant fraction  j of the entire population at any point in
time.







where years denotes the number of years modeled. The relative size of agents dying each period



















where c is consumption, h is the health stock, ηj is the age dependent intensity parameter of
consumption, and σ is the inverse of the relative risk aversion parameter.
3.3 Production of Health
We use the idea of health capital as introduced in Grossman (1972b). In this economy there
are two commodities: a consumption good c and medical services m. The consumption good
is produced via a neoclassical production function that is described later. We do not model
the production sector for medical services. Each unit of consumption good can be transformed
into 1
pm units of medical care. All medical care is used to produce new units of health. The
accumulation process of health is given by
hj = φjm
ξ
j + (1 − δ(hj))hj−1 + εj, (1)
where hj denotes the current health status, φjm
ξ
j denotes the production of new health with
inputs of medical care mj and parameters ξ > 0, φj being an age dependent productivity
parameter, and δ(hj) is the health deterioration rate which depends on the current health
status. This partly captures the “immediacy” of health expenditures. The longer the agent
waits to treat her health shock, the larger the health depreciation becomes. Finally, εj is an






, where the term in brackets is the marginal contribution to health
of an additional unit of health care.7
The agent has to decide how much to spend out-of-pocket on medical care. We only
model discretionary health expenditures mj in this paper. Income will have a strong eﬀect on
endogenous total medical expenses. Our setup assumes that given the same magnitude of health
shock εj, a richer individual will outspend a poor individual. This may be realistic in some
circumstances. However, a large fraction of health expenditures are probably non-discretionary
(e.g. health expenditures caused by a catastrophic health event that requires surgery etc.). In
7Compare Suen (2006) for a similar formulation.
5such cases a poor individual could still incur large health care costs. We do not cover this case
in the current model.
Exogenous health shocks εj follow a Markov process with age dependent transition matrix
Pj. Transition probabilities from one state to the next depend on the past health shock εj−1
so that an element of transition matrix Pj is deﬁned as
Pj (εj,εj−1) = Pr(εj|εj−1,j).
3.4 Human Capital Proﬁle
Eﬀective human capital over the life-cycle evolves according to
ej =
 




for j = {1,...,J1}, (2)
where β0,β2 < 0, β1 > 0 and χ ∈ [0,1]. This mimics a hump-shaped income process over the
life-cycle and makes the wage income of agents dependent on their health state as well. This
expression says that an otherwise identical individual will be more productive and have higher
income if she has relatively better health (e.g. fewer sick days, better job matching because job
provided health insurance is less of an issue for a healthy individual, better career advancement
of healthy individuals, etc.).
Tuning parameter θ allows us to gradually diminish the inﬂuence of health on the production
process and individual household income, holding the exogenous age dependent component
ﬁxed. This parameter determines to what degree health is an investment good.
3.5 Health Insurance and Out-of-Pocket Medical Expenses
We do not distinguish between group insurance (employer provided) and individual insurance
(bought by individuals in the private insurance market). We therefore combine elements of
group insurance (e.g. tax deductibility of premium payments) with elements from the individual
insurance market (e.g. screening by age) in order to make a statement about the entire private
insurance market.
In the model, the working agent can decide between a low deductible health insurance, a
high deductible health insurance, or no health insurance. These health insurances are employer
provided so that health insurance premiums are tax deductible. In addition, we assume that
health insurance companies can screen the worker by age but not by health status.8
We can interpret the model as if the employee can choose to work for three diﬀerent types
of employers. Employer one is oﬀering a low deductible health insurance via an insurance
company, employer two is oﬀering a high deductible health insurance via a diﬀerent insurance
company, and employer type three oﬀers no health insurance. The tax deductible health insur-
ance premium that enters the workers budget constraint together with the wage income can
then be interpreted as the eﬀective wage income. As a consequence, an employee with a health
insurance package receives a lower eﬀective wage than an employee working a job without
health insurance. Since we do not model employer matching, we abstract from these details
and simply claim that the employee can make the employment and insurance type choice. This
8We are aware that employers are not allowed to discriminate according to health status or age when oﬀering
health insurance. However, we think this is still an acceptable assumption. Between 2000 and 2002, older
workers experienced rising unemployment rates that were greater in relative magnitude than those for younger
workers over the same period (Six (2003)). This suggests that older worker are more likely to lose their employer
provided health insurance. They are then forced to buy insurance in the individual market, where they have to
pay higher premiums because of their age.
6also allows us to only have one representative ﬁrm that pays one wage rate. Employees then
decide on their eﬃciency wage by deciding which insurance they want to have.
Insurance companies oﬀer two types of health policies, a low deductible policy with deduct-
ible ρ and copayment rate γ at a premium pj and a high deductible policy with deductible ρ′
and copayment γ′ at a premium p′
j. These premiums are tax deductible.
In order to be insured against a health shock, households have to buy insurance one period
prior to the realization of their health shock. Agents in their ﬁrst period of life are thus not
covered by any insurance. We distinguish between three possible insurance states, inj−1 =
{1,2,3}, where inj−1 = 1 is the state of having a low deductible health insurance in period
j, inj−1 = 2 denotes the high deductible health insurance in period j and inj−1 = 3 indicates
that the agent has no health insurance in period j. The working household’s out of pocket





min[pm,Insmj,ρ + γ (pm,Insmj − ρ)]
min[pm,Insmj,ρ′ + γ′ (pm,Insmj − ρ′)]
pm,noInsmj
if inj−1 = 1
if inj−1 = 2
if inj−1 = 3
for j ≤ J1,
where pm,Ins is the relative price of health expenditures paid by insured workers and pm,noIns
is the price of health expenditures paid by uninsured workers. An uninsured worker pays
a higher price pm,noIns > pm,Ins. The copayment rate γ is the fraction the household pays
after the insurance company pays (1 − γ) of the post deductible amount pm,Insmj − ρ. Since
households have to buy insurance before health shocks are revealed we assume that working
households in their last period j = J1 already decide to buy into Medicare.
After retirement all agents are covered by Medicare. Each agent pays a ﬁxed premium pMed
every period for Medicare. Medicare then pays a ﬁxed fraction
 
1 − γMed 
of the health ex-
penditures that exceed the amount of the deductible ρMed. The total out of pocket expenditures
of a retiree are






, if j > J1 + 1,
where pm,Med is the price of health expenditures that retirees with Medicare have to pay. We
assume that old agents j > J1+1 do not purchase private health insurance and that their health
costs are covered by Medicare and their own resources plus social insurance (e.g. Medicaid) if
applicable.9
3.6 Health Savings Accounts
If agents buy a high deductible health insurance they can decide on the amount of assets am
j
they want to carry tax free into the next period at the market interest rate. Agents can only
contribute to their HSA when they are younger than 65. Agents can pay their out-of-pocket
medical expenses o(mj) directly with savings from their HSAs. If they oversave in HSAs they
can roll over the account balance into the next period.10 Savings accumulate tax free.
If agents decide to use funds from the HSA to pay for non qualiﬁed health expenses, they
have to pay a tax penalty at rate τm and forgone income tax. This penalty only applies to
9According to the Medical Expendiure Panel Survey (MEPS) 2001, only 15% of total health expenditures of
individuals older than 65 are covered by supplementary insurances. Cutler and Wise (2003) report that 97%
of people above age 65 are enrolled in Medicare which covers 56% of their total health expenditures. Medicare
Plan B requires the payment of a monthly premium and a yearly deductible. See Medicare and You (2007) for
a brief summary of Medicare.
10This feature distinguishes HSAs from Flexible Spending Accounts (FSAs).
7agents younger than 65 years. Agents older than 65 can use the money in their HSA for non-
health related expenses without having to pay the tax penalty τm. However, they have to pay
income taxes on income spent in this way. An agent’s out of pocket expenses when retired can
still be paid with funds from the HSAs. The Medicare premium also qualiﬁes for penalty free
deductions from HSAs.
If they undersave and the funds in the HSAs do not cover all medical expenses, then the
household has to use standard savings income to ﬁnance her residual medical expenses and
consumption when old. In addition, there is an upper limit on the annual contribution to an
HSA which we denote   sm.11
3.7 Households






where aj−1 is the capital stock at the beginning of the period , am
j−1 is the capital stock
accumulated in HSAs at the beginning of the period, hj−1 is the health state at the beginning
of the period, inj−1 is the insurance state in period j (chosen by the agent in the previous
period j − 1), and εj ∈ {ε1j,ε2j,ε3j,ε4j,ε5j} is one of ﬁve possible negative health shocks
where 0 ≥ ε1j > ε2j > ...,ε5j.














∈ R+ × R+ × R+ × InR × R− = D if j > J1,
where InW = {1,2,3} and InR = {1,2}. Retired agents have only two insurance states,
InR = 1 they have Medicare Plan B and InR = 2 they don’t have Medicare Plan B. The latter
is only an option in their ﬁrst period of retirement. Thereafter all retirees are forced to have
Medicare Plan B, so that inj−1 = 1, for j > J1 + 1. For each xj ∈ D(xj) let Λ(xj) denote the
measure of age-j agents with xj ∈ D. The fraction  jΛ(xj) then denotes the measure of age-j
agents with xj ∈ D with respect to the entire population of agents in the economy.
3.7.1 Workers
Agents receive income in the form of wages, interest income, accidental bequests, and social
insurance. The latter guarantees a minimum consumption level of c. After health shocks are
realized, agents simultaneously decide their consumption cj, stocks of capital for the next
period aj, and health expenditures mj. They also pick the insurance state for the next period
inj = {1,2,3}, which requires them to pay a premium pj for inj = 1, p′
j for inj = 2, or nothing
for inj = 3.
If agents decide to buy a high deductible insurance, i.e. if inj = 2, then they are eligible
to hold am
j in an HSA. If they do not purchase a high deductible insurance for the following
period, then they are not eligible for HSAs anymore and they have to dissolve their existing
HSAs completely.12
11The contribution limit to HSA for 2007 for individuals is $2,850. Compare
http://www.treas.gov/oﬃces/public-aﬀairs/hsa/07IndexedAmounts.shtml
12This is a simpifying assumption. What the law actually states is that if the policy holder ends her participa-
tion in the HDHP (High Deductible Health Plan), she loses eligibility to deposit further funds, but funds already
in the HSA remain available for use. Since our period is actually 9 years long, we think that the assumption
that the agent has to completely dissolve the account in that period is not too strong.
8In their last period of work, agents decide whether to buy into Medicare Plan B. We make
the assumption that premium payments for Medicare Plan B are not tax deductible and that
agents can only continue to save in HSAs if they buy into Medicare Plan B. We later calibrate
the model so that all workers in their last period buy into Medicare Plan B.13
With HSAs we have to distinguish in each period between agents who contribute to HSAs
and those who take funds out of HSAs. Among those who do not contribute each period, we
have to further distinguish between those that use these funds for health related expenses and
those that use them for consumption. The latter have to pay a penalty tax τm when they
are younger than 65 years old. In addition, they have to pay forgone income tax on funds
withdrawn for non-qualiﬁed expenses.
The household problem for young agents j = {1,...,J1 − 1} who are net contributors can




















cj + aj + 1{inj=2}am
j + oW (mj) + 1{inj=1}pj + 1{inj=2}p′
j
= ˜ wj + R
 
aj−1 + TBeq 
+ Rmam




j + (1 − δ(hj))hj−1 + εj,








min[pm,Insmj,ρ + γ (pm,Insmj − ρ)]
min[pm,Insmj,ρ′ + γ′ (pm,Insmj − ρ′)]
pm,noInsm
if inj−1 = 1,
if inj−1 = 2,
if inj−1 = 3,
NWj = Rmam





1 − 0.5τSoc − 0.5τMed
 
wej, (5)



























j−1 − oW (mj)
  
.
Variable cj is consumption, aj is next period’s capital stock,14 am
j is next period’s capital stock
13Although Medicare Plan B payments are itemizable as qualiﬁed medical expenses in the income tax
statement, there is the additional provision that says that only medical payments that exceed 7.5% of
the adjusted gross income (Form 1040, line 38) are tax deductible. Compare the IRS publication at:
http://www.irs.gov/publications/p502/ar02.html#d0e299
What we implicityly assume here is that Medical expenses do not exceed this limit and therefore premiums
for Medicare are not tax deductible.
14Agents are borrowing constrained, in the sense that that aj ≥ 0. Without a borrowing constraint households
would make the maximum allowable contribution to their HSAs if interest rates were fully tax deductible (this
was possible until 1986). Borrowing constraints can either be modeled as a wedge between the interest rates on
9in HSAs,   sm is the maximum contribution into HSAs per period, oW (mj) is out-of-pocket health
expenditure, mj is total health expenditure, pj is the insurance premium for the low deductible
health insurance, p′
j is the insurance premium for the high deductible health insurance, ˜ wj is
wage income net of the employer contribution to Social Security and Medicare, R is the gross
interest rate paid on assets aj−1 from the previous period and accidental bequests T
Beq
j , Taxj
is total taxes paid15 and TSI
j is Social Insurance (e.g. Medicaid and food stamp programs).





leads to a double taxation of
a portion of wage income due to the ﬂat payroll tax 0.5
 
τSoc + τMed 
˜ wj that is added. This
mimics the institutional feature of income and payroll taxes.16
NWj is net wealth in the HSA after subtracting out-of-pocket health expenses, NIj is






progressive income tax, 0.5
 
τSoc + τMed 
˜ wj is the payroll tax that the household pays for
Social Security and Medicare, and τmNIj is the penalty tax for non-qualiﬁed withdrawals from
the HSA, ˜ yW
j is the tax base for the income tax composed of wage income and interest income
on assets and accidental bequests. We subtract net contributions NIj to HSAs because they
are tax deductible.
For net contributors it has to hold that NIj ≥ 0, that is, next periods funds am
j in the
HSA have to be larger than the funds at the beginning of the period minus the allowed health
related expenditures (e.g. out-of-pocket health expenses oW that can be ﬁnanced with HSA
funds).
For net non-contributors the corresponding constraints are
NIj < 0,













with all other constraints being the same as for contributors. Net non-contributors draw funds
from HSAs beyond what is allowed so that NIj < 0 and therefore pay the penalty tax τm on
the part spent on non-health related expenditures τmNIj. In addition they pay the forgone
income tax, since the term NIj is negative and enters the base for taxable income ˜ yW
j .
The Social Insurance program TSI
j guarantees a minimum consumption level c. If Social
Insurance is paid out then automatically aj = am
j = 0 and inj = 3 (the no insurance state) so
that Social Insurance cannot be used to ﬁnance savings, savings into HSAs and private health
insurance.17
borrowing and lending, or a threshold on the minimum asset position. See also Imrohoroglu, Imrohoroglu and
Joines (1998) for a further discussion.
15If health insurance was provided by the employer, so that premiums would be partly paid for by the employer,
then the tax function would change to

















where ψ is the fraction of the premium paid for by the employer. Jeske and Kitao (2005) use a similar formulation
to model private vs. employer provided health insurance. They pick ψ = 0.85 based on MEPS data in 1997.
We simplify this aspect of the model and assume that all health insurance policies are oﬀered via the employer
and that the employee pays the entire premium, so that ψ = 0. The premium is therefore tax deductible in the
employee (or household) budget constraint.
16Compare Social Security Tax Reform (Art#3).
17The stipulations for Medicaid eligibility encompass maximum income levels but also maximum wealth levels.
Some individuals who fail to be classiﬁed as ’categorically needy’ because they have to much savings could still
10Agents can only buy insurance if they have suﬃcient funds to do so, that is whenever
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j−1 − oW (mj) − Taxj.
The social insurance program will not pay for their health insurance. In their last working
period J1 agents decide whether to buy Medicare insurance or not. This determines their
insurance state in the ﬁrst period of retirement. Agents have to enrol in Medicare in order to
keep their HSAs. From J1 + 1 onwards, all agents are forced into Medicare.
3.7.2 Retired Agents
Retired agents in their ﬁrst period of retirement are insured under Medicare if workers in their
last period decided to buy into Medicare Plan B. From then onwards we force retirees to buy
into Medicare insurance until they die. Retirees in general, that is, all agents with age j > J1
are not allowed to make tax exempt contributions to HSAs anymore (that is agents older than
65). So they are all classiﬁed as net non-contributors. In addition, the tax penalty τm for
non-health expenditures of HSA funds does not apply anymore. However, if the individual
uses HSA funds for non-health related expenditures, she has to pay income tax. Retirees can
pay the Medicare insurance premium pMed with funds from the HSA.
The household problem for a retired agent j ≥ J1 + 1 who is a non-contributor and pays
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be eligibile as ’medically needy’ (e.g. caretaker relatives, aged persons older than 65, blind individuals, etc.)
We will therefore make the simplifying assumption that before the Social Insurance program kicks in the
individual has to use up all her wealth. Jeske and Kitao (2005) follows a similar approach.
See http://www.cms.hhs.gov/MedicaidEligibility
for details on Medicaid eligibility.
11Non-contributors who use HSA funds for non-health related expenses have to pay income tax
on these funds (no penalty τm applies for agents older than 65). Therefore only constraint (6)
changes to
NIj < 0,
and all other conditions are the same as in the previous case.
3.8 Insurance Companies
Insurance companies satisfy their budget constraint within each period. We allow for cross
subsidizing across generations. The constraints for two insurance companies selling the low
and high deductible health insurance respectively are
(1 + ω1) ×
 J1+1
j=2  j
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where ω1 and ω2 are markup factors that determine the proﬁts of insurance companies, I{inj(xj)=1}
is an indicator function equal to 1 whenever agents bought the low deductible health insurance
policy and I{inj(xj)=2} is an indicator function equal to one whenever agents bought the high
deductible insurance. Since agents have to buy their insurance one period prior to the realiza-
tion of the health shock, ﬁrst period agents are not insured. In addition, this lag implies that
insurance premiums gain interest over one period. We clear low and high deductible insurances
separately by adjusting the respective premium. Proﬁts are redistributed in equal amounts
to all surviving agents. Alternatively, we could discard the proﬁts (“thrown in the ocean”).
In this sense we think of them as loading costs (ﬁxed costs) associated with running private
insurance companies.
3.9 Firms
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, (9)
taking (q,w) as given.
3.10 Government
The government taxes workers’ income (wages, interest income, interest on bequests) at a pro-
gressive tax rate ˜ τ (˜ yj) which is a function of taxable income ˜ y and ﬁnances the social insurance












Government spending G plays no further role (“thrown in the ocean”).

















where νj denotes the deceased mass of agents aged j in time t. An equivalent notation applies
for the surviving population of workers and retirees denoted  j.
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The Medicare program is self-ﬁnancing (and paid on a pay-as-you go basis so that the
insurance premiums do not accumulate interest from last period)
 J
j=J1+1  j
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Deﬁnition 1 Given the exogenous, transition probabilities Pj, realizations of health shocks
εj = {ε1j,ε2j,ε3j,ε4j,ε5j}
J
j=1 , the survival probabilities {πj}
J
j=1 and the exogenous government
policies
 
˜ τ (˜ y(xj)),τK J
j=1 , a competitive equilibrium with health savings accounts is a




j=1 of individual household decisions
{c(xj), a(xj), am (xj), m(xj), in(xj)}
J
j=1 , aggregate stocks of physical capital and human









j=1 solves the consumer problem (3),








R = q + 1 − δ,
(c) markets clear










13(d) the aggregate resource constraint holds




(c(xj) + pm (xj)m(xj))dΛ(xj) = Y + (1 − δ)K,
(e) the government programs clear so that (11),(12),(13), and (10) hold,
(f) the budget constraints of insurance companies (7) and (8) hold












where 1 is an indicator function.
We use a standard numeric algorithm to solve the model.18
4 Calibration
We calibrate the model without HSAs to the U.S. economy before 2003. We target key ratios
from the U.S. National Income Accounts (NIPA), the U.S. Census and the Medical Expenditure
Panel Survey (MEPS). In addition, we match some demographic features of the U.S. as well as
features of average U.S. life cycle proﬁles.
4.1 Demographics
One period is deﬁned as 9 years. We model J = 8 periods, that is households from age 20 to
92. The annual conditional survival probabilities are taken from the U.S. Life-Tables in 2003
and adjusted for the period length.19 We plot the survival curves in panel 1 of ﬁgure 1. The
total population over the age of 65 is 13.97%, which is between the numbers in the U.S. Census
(12.4%) and the 20% used in Jeske and Kitao (2005) who only look at heads of households.
4.2 Preferences
The relative risk aversion parameter is σ = 1.5 and the annual discount factor is β = 1.025.
Both parameters are picked to match the capital output ratio and the interest rate. It is clear
that in a general equilibrium model every parameter aﬀects all equilibrium variables. Here we
associate parameters with those equilibrium variables that are the most directly (quantitatively)
aﬀected.
The weight of consumption in the utility function is age dependent and summarized in
vector
ηj = {0.65,0.95,0.96,0.96,0.95,0.85,0.80,0.80}. In conjunction with the magnitudes of the
health shocks these weights ensure that the model matches total health spending and the take-
up ratio of health insurance. We thereby assume that the very young and the very old have
a higher preference weight on their health than the middle aged. In the model we need the
relatively large preference for health of the young generation in order to induce them to buy
insurance.
18We discuss the algorithm in Appendix B, which is available on the authors’ website at
http://pages.towson.edu/jjung/papers/hsa_appendixB.pdf
19ftp://ftp.cdc.gov/pub/Health_Statistics/NCHS/Publications/NVSR/54_14/Table01.xls
144.3 Production of Health
The productivity parameter φj of the health production function is age dependent and sum-
marized in vector φ ={1.5, 1.5, 1.5, 1.5, 1.5, 1.5, 1.65, 1.65}. This is similar to the production
parameter in Suen (2006) for a very similar production function of health. In addition, Gross-
man (1972a) and Stratmann (1999) estimate positive eﬀects of medical services on measures
of health outcomes.
The second parameter is picked at ξ = 0.35. We do not have data on these parameters
and conduct sensitivity analysis. We assume that health depreciation depends on the current
health state but is independent of age and current health care spending. Health depreciates
at rates between δ(hj = hmin) = 0.8658 and δ(hj = hmax) = 0.7145. We chose this structure
so that health depreciates faster when the health state is already low. This feature captures
the urgency of treatment. We pick these numbers to match total health expenditures in the
economy and the take up ratios for insurance over the life-cycle.
4.3.1 Transition Probabilities
We estimate the health shocks in the law of motion of health capital using data from seven
waves of the RAND-HRS (Health and Retirement Survey) between 1992 and 2004. We ﬁrst
use a linear probability model and estimate expression (1) where we impose that health capital
hj can attain ﬁve possible health states. These health states correspond to ﬁve self reported
health states in the HRS. In addition, we impose an AR(1) structure on the health shocks
(the errors in expression (1)). After estimating the AR(1) process for the shocks, we simulate
health shocks for 10,000 agents for each of 10 starting health shocks that we obtain from the
data. We then collect the shocks into ﬁve risk classes and label them from 1 (lowest shock) to
5 (highest shock). We then count how many of the simulated agents move from health shock
1 at age j − 1 to health shocks 1,2,...,5 at age j. This will give us the conditional transition
probabilities P (εj|εj−1 = 1). We follow the same procedure for εj−1 = {2,3,4,5}. We adjust
for the period length of 9 years and allow for age group speciﬁc transition probabilities. In an
eight period model this will result in seven 5 × 5 Markov switching matrices. Since we need
one Markov switching matrix for each generation, we impose that the ﬁrst two age groups have
the same Markov switching matrix between health shocks.20 All transition matrices for all 8
age groups are reported in table 1 in Appendix B which also contains the details about the
estimation technique.21
4.3.2 Magnitude of Health Shocks
The shocks to health εj = {ε1,j,ε2,j,...,ε5,j} are chosen to match the insurance coverage take-
up rate (percentage of workers buying the low deductible health insurance per age group) and
the share of medical spending in GDP. Table 3 presents the matrix of age dependent health
shocks associated with each one of the ﬁve health states. In order to identify the model we put
restrictions on the shock structure. Shocks 1, 2, and 3 do not change over age for workers and
shocks 1,2,3, and 4 do not change over age for retirees. All other shocks are unrestricted, so
that the number of free parameters from the 8 × 5 shock matrix is 19.
20Alternatively we could estimate an AR1 process for the health shocks in expression (1) and then use Tauchen’s
method (see Tauchen (1986) or Heer and Maussner (2005) for more details) to transform the estimated AR1
process into a discrete Markov switching process.
21Appendix B is available on the authors’ website at: http://pages.towson.edu/jjung/papers/hsa_appendixB.pdf
154.4 Human Capital Proﬁle
Eﬀective human capital evolves according to expression (2). We use the following estimates
for
 
ˆ β0, ˆ β1, ˆ β2
 
= {8.12, 0.14, −0.0015}. These estimates are obtained by ﬁtting a second
order polynomial to summarized income data from the CPS (see Income, Poverty, and Health
Insurance Coverage in the United States: 2005 (2006)), according to
log(income) = β0 + β1age + β2age2 + ε.
This represents the exogenous part of expression (2). After taking the endogenous health
capital into account, the model reproduces the hump shaped average eﬃciency units of the
human capital proﬁle depicted in panel 2 of ﬁgure 2. We normalized the proﬁle and compare it
to the normalized income proﬁle from the data. Fernandez-Villaverde and Krueger (2004) show
similar income patterns using data from the Consumer Expenditures Survey over the period
1980-1998.
For parameter χ we pick 0.85. We pick this rather large weight on age because it produces
more stable results as the feedback from the endogenous health choice is diminished. We also
do not want to inﬂate the eﬀects of health. We are not aware of any estimates for parameter
χ and will therefore conduct sensitivity analysis.
This modelling restriction together with the empirical evidence in the literature on medical
services, health, and productivity 22 suggests that parameter θ is strictly greater than zero so
that health is a consumption and investment good. A strictly positive parameter θ will capture
the negative income eﬀect of bad health to some extent. In general it is challenging to infer
the exact magnitude of health productivity parameter θ from existing microeconomic studies.
Ashraf, Lester and Weil (2007) conduct an empirical analysis of health productivity and use
a similar functional structure of technology. They conclude that given the existing empirical
literature it is not possible to infer the exact magnitude of such health productivity parameters.
We therefore analyze the eﬀects of HSAs for the range of θ ∈ [0,1], where θ = 0 indicates that
health is a pure consumption good and as such unproductive and θ = 1 indicates that health
is also an investment good with strong eﬀects on the formation of human capital.
4.5 Health Insurance and Out-of-Pocket Medical Expenses
4.5.1 Insurance Premiums, Coinsurance Rates and Deductibles
Insurance premiums are age dependent. We use a base premium p0 and an exogenous age
dependent premium growth rate gj to calculate the premium for each age group. We express
the premium of j year old agents for high and low deductible health insurances as
pj = p0 × gj, and p′
j = p′
0 × gj for all j ∈ {1,...,J1}. (14)
We estimate a common growth factor for insurance premiums gj for each age group using sum-
mary data on individual health insurance premiums from The Cost and Beneﬁt of Individual
Health Insurance Plans (2005) and impose that both low and high deductible insurance premi-
ums grow at the same rate gj. We then ﬁt a simple second order polynomial to the growth
22There is a growing empirical literature documenting the relationship between medical services, health, and
productivity or growth (e.g. Grossman (1972a), Stratmann (1999), Grossman (2000), Behrman, Hoddinott,
Maluccio, Martorell, Quisumbing and Stein (2003), Bloom, Canning and Sevilla (2004), Jamison and Wang
(2005), Maccini and Yang (2005), Alderman and Kinsey (2006), Cawley (2004), Schultz (2005), Greve (2007),
and Weil (2007)).
16rate of age dependent premiums which results in an estimate of the following equation
gj = x0 + x1 × age + x2 × age2 + ε for all j ∈ {1,...,J1}. (15)
The estimates for the regressors are {ˆ x0, ˆ x1, ˆ x2} = {0.7781, 0.0036, 0.0007}. We present the
age dependent premium growth rates in panel 2 of ﬁgure 1. Expressions (14) and (15) together
with endogenous base premiums p0 and p′
0 will determine all insurance premiums (low - and
high deductibles) for all age groups.23
Following Suen (2006) we pick coinsurance rate γ = 25% for the low deductible insurance.
The coinsurance rate for the high deductible insurance is slightly lower at γ = 20%. We pick
this number lower so that in the benchmark economy the majority of agents buys the low
deductible insurance. The coinsurance rate for Medicare γMed is also 25%.24
Since deductibles are level variables, calibrating them is more involved because we need
to ﬁnd expressions for suitable ratios that can be normalized. In the following we match the
ratios of the deductibles against each other, as well as ratios of average insurance premiums
to median income, and ﬁnally, ratios of deductibles themselves to median income and average
insurance premiums.
We use data reported in Fronstin and Collins (2006), Claxton, Gabel, Gil, Pickreign, Whit-
more, Finder, DiJulio and Hawkins (2006), GAO (2006), and the U.S. Census to calculate these
fractions.25 In our benchmark model without HSAs, the average premium for low deductible
insurance is 0.88 vs. 1.22 for the high deductible insurance and the premium for Medicare is
0.72. These premiums result in premium ratios that are close to the ratios in the data. All
ratios, data and model generated, are reported in table 6.
4.5.2 Price of Medical Services
In order to pin down the relative price of consumption goods vs. medical care goods, we use
the average ratio of the consumer price index (CPI) and the Medical CPI between 1992 and
2006. We calculate the relative price to be pm = 1.52.26
The price of medical services for uninsured agents is higher than for insured agents. Various
studies have pointed to the fact that uninsured individuals pay up to 50% (and more) higher
prices for prescription drugs as well as hospital services (see Playing Fair, State Action to Lower
Prescription Drug Prices (2000)). The national average is a markup of around 60% for the
uninsured population (Brown (2006)).
We therefore pick a markup factor of 1.6 so that pm,nIns = 1.6 × pm,Ins. According to the
U.S. Census 2004, the fraction of the population without insurance is roughly 15.7%.27 Using
all this information we solve the following system of equations for the relative prices that the
insured and uninsured pay for medical services
 
1.52 = 0.843 × pm,Ins + 0.157 × pm,nIns,
pm,nIns = 1.6 × pm,Ins,
23Base premiums p0 and p
′
0 will adjust to clear the insurance companies budget constraints (7) and (8). The
premium for Medicare p
Med is assumed to be age independent and clears (13).
24According to Medicare News from November 2005 the coinsurance rates for hospital services under the
Outpatient Prospective Payment System (OPPS) will be reduced to 20% of the hospital’s total payment. Overall,
average beneﬁciary copayments for all outpatient services are expected to fall from 33% of total payments in
2005 to 29% in 2006.
Visit: http://www.cms.hhs.gov/apps/media/press/release.asp?Counter=1506
25See the Appendix B for details.
26Compare: http://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/surveymost?cu
27http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/hlthins/hlthin04/hlth04asc.html
17which results in pm,nIns = 2.2226 and pm,Ins = 1.3891. This assumes that the overall price
diﬀerence between consumption and health services is a weighted average of the prices that the
insured and uninsured pay for health services.
4.6 Health Savings Accounts
There is an annual contribution limit to HSAs. According to the Revenue Procedure 2006-53
the upper limit is   sm = $2,850 for an individual ($5,650 for a family). In order to relate the
level of the upper limit to the variables in the model we will tie the contribution limit to the
high deductible using the following formula
  sm = ρ′ × (1 + ν),
where ν is a markup on the high deductible ρ′. Since the average high deductible is around
$2,330 according to Fronstin and Collins (2006) we get a markup factor of (1 + ν) = ¯ sm
ρ′ =
$2,850
$2,330 = 1.2232. In our experiments we use the following range of savings limits:   sm ={$2,680;
$2,850; ...;$10,000}. The tax penalty for withdrawing funds that are not used for eligible
health expenses is τm = 10%.
4.7 Insurance Companies
The fraction of insured in our model economy is highly sensitive to the equilibrium prices of
insurance contracts. We start the baseline model with a zero proﬁt condition on insurance
companies, ω = 0, and let the base premiums p0 and p′
0 adjust to satisfy the the budget
constraint of the insurance companies.
4.8 Firms
We choose a standard capital share in production of α = 0.33. Total factor productivity A = 4.
Nadiri and Prucha (1996) report estimates for depreciation rates of physical capital of 5.9%
and depreciation of R&D capital is 12%. In our model we pick a capital depreciation rate of
δ = 10% which is a standard value in the calibration literature (e.g. Kydland and Prescott
(1982)). The depreciation per period is then 1 − (1 − δ)(years/J) = 1 − 0.972/8 = 0.6126.
4.9 Government
The tax penalty for withdrawing funds from HSAs before the age of 65 and using them on
non-health related consumption is τm = 10%. Social security taxes are τSoc = 2 × 6.2% on
earnings up to $97,500. This contribution is made by both employee and employer. The Old-
Age and Survivors Insurance Security tax rate is a little lower at 10.6% and has been used by
Jeske and Kitao (2005) in a similar calibration. We therefore match τSoc at 10.6% picking the
appropriate pension replacement ratio Ψ to be 21%.28 The size of the social security program is
then 6% of GDP. This is close the number reported in The 2002 Annual Report of the Board of
Trustees of the Federal Old-Age and Survivors Insurance and Disability Insurance Trust Funds
(2002) which is 5% for 2002.
28Social security transfers are deﬁned as T
Soc
j (x) = Ψwej (hj−1) and they are the same for all agents. Transfers
are a function of the active wage of a worker in her last period of work, so that j = J1. In addition we assume
that hj−1 is a constant and the same for all agents. We pick it to be equal
h0,J1+hggridh,J1
2 , which is the “middle”
health state of the health grid vector. Biggs, Brown and Springstead (2005) report a 45% replacement rate for
the average worker in the U.S. and Whitehouse (2003) ﬁnds similar rates for OECD countries.
18Medicare taxes are τMed = 2×1.45% on all earnings again split in employer and employee
contributions (see Social Security Update 2007 (2007)). In order to get an appropriate premium
for Medicare pMed, so that the Medicare premium is lower than the private health insurance
premiums, we have to pick the payroll tax (which helps to ﬁnance Medicare) suﬃciently high.
We use τMed = 4% which leads to a slightly larger Medicare program (4.44% of GDP) than
what we observe in the data (2.5% of GDP according to 2002 Annual Report of the Board of
Trustees of the Federal Hospital Insurance and Federal Supplementary Medical Insurance Trust
Funds (2002)).
Using the income tax rates of the U.S. income tax of 2005 we follow Guner, Kaygusuz and
Ventura (2007) and estimate the following equation
marginalTaxRate(income) = β0 + β1 log(income) + ε, (16)
where marginalTaxRate(income) is the marginal tax rate that applies when taxable income
equals income. Variable income is household income normalized with an assumed maximum
income level of $400,000. We then ﬁt equation (16) to the normalized income data. The
estimated coeﬃcients for the tax function are then ˆ β0 = 0.3411 and ˆ β1 = 0.0659 so that the
income tax function becomes
T (income) =
marginalTaxRate(income)
      
[0.3411 + 0.659 × log(income)] × taxable income, (17)
where T (income) is total income tax paid. In addition, we impose a lower bound of 0%
and an upper bound of 35% on the marginal income tax rate. Picking the maximum income
level at $400,000 will aﬀect the estimates for the marginal tax function in (16) since it will
determine the “tax bins” that individuals fall into. We report a graph of the approximation of
the marginal tax rate against the tax code in panel 3 of ﬁgure 1. Note that the approximated
marginal income tax is slightly below the marginal income tax from the tax code. We think this
is justiﬁed since we do not explicitly account for negative income tax of low income households,
tax loopholes, and the fact that marginal income taxes only apply for the speciﬁc brackets.
In our model, we similarly normalize taxable income of every agent with the maximum
income of the richest agent in the economy to get the normalized variable income. We use this
normalized income directly in (17) to get the marginal tax rate and the sum total of payable
income tax for each individual.29
Since income tax revenue is collected to pay for the social insurance program TSI (e.g.
foodstamps, etc.) and the residual becomes government consumption G, we want to make sure
that the size of government consumption also conforms to the data (G/Y = 20.3% compared
to 20.2% reported in Castaneda, Diaz-Gimenez and Rios-Rull (2003)).
4.10 Calibration Results
Medical Expenditures We match two important measures of medical expenditures; the
share of medical spending as a fraction of GDP and the distribution of medical expenditures
by population size.30 First, our model generates total medical expenditures of 17.6% in terms
of GDP, which is in the range between 16% and 17% of GDP for US in 2005 according to
Baicker (2006) and Fang and Gavazza (2007). Second, our model does a good job in matching
29Another method is to use the tax function estimated in Gouveia and Strauss (1994).
30Another measure of health expenditures, the medical expenditure proﬁle, is not matched well by the model.
The model overstates health care spending of the young as a fraction of their income and understates the fraction
of health spending as a percentage of income of the elderly.
19the distribution of health care expenditure by population size (see Yu and Ezzati-Rice (2005)
and table 4). We see that a small fraction of the population is responsible for a large amount
of total health expenditures e.g. 1% of the population is responsible for 22% of total health
expenditures. The model matches the high concentration of health care expenditures fairly
well but slightly understates the concentration of the 1% of highest spenders (20.6% in the
model vs. 22% reported in the data). The model underpredicts the concentration of health
care spending if we look at larger shares of the population. At higher percentages the model’s
match improves again.
Number of Insured Workers Panel one in ﬁgure 2 shows the fraction of insured workers
and distinguishes between private and public insurance. We overlay the information from
the data with the insurance take-up ratios from the model. For the latter we distinguish
between low and high deductible health insurances. In the model we concentrate on private
insurance for workers and public insurance (Medicare) for retirees. We see that the model
slightly underestimates the takeup rate of insurance for young workers and overestimates the
takeup rate for older workers.
We calibrate the fraction of agents buying health insurance to be the 76.5% where 95.4%
of this group buys the low deductible insurance and the residual 4.6% buy the high deductible
insurance.31 According to MEPS data of 2005, 86.1% of the population under age 65 do have
health insurance (70.1% is private and 16% is public). In addition, almost 100% of all retired
workers do have health insurance via Medicare.
The model’s low take up ratio for the high deductible insurance needs some justiﬁcation.
Fronstin and Collins (2006) ﬁnd that enrollment in HDHPs that would qualify for HSAs is
roughly 8% and that only 1% is currently holding HSAs.32 In the benchmark model without
HSAs we practically model the situation in the U.S. prior to 2003. We therefore think the low
take up rate of high deductible insurances of only 4.6% is justiﬁed.
Life-Cycle Wealth Panel 3 in ﬁgure 2 shows the asset distribution over various age
groups. We see that the model reproduces the hump shaped pattern in the data. The data
is from the U.S. Census in 2000. Table 5 reports the asset and income distributions of the
model by quintiles and compares them to the data from Diaz-Gimenez, Quadrini and Rios-
Rull (1997) and Budria-Rodriguez, Diaz-Gimenez, Quadrini and Rios-Rull (2002). The model
does not match the wealth and income distributions accurately. One of the main reasons is the
lack of a bequest motive. We therefore cannot match the high wealth concentrations that we
observe in U.S. data. Including a bequest motive into the current framework poses a challenge,
both on theoretical as well as on computational grounds. The wealth Gini coeﬃcient is 0.73
which is smaller than the 0.80 from 1998 data. The Gini coeﬃcient of income is 0.43 in the
model compared to 0.553 in Budria-Rodriguez et al. (2002).
5 Results
In this section we ﬁrst explain the economic mechanism underlying our model. We then system-
atically explore two important general equilibrium eﬀects that both determine the performance
of HSAs, a savings eﬀect and a human capital eﬀect. At the end of this section we run a quant-
itative experiment and calculate an upper threshold for the likely cost of HSAs for the U.S.
taxpayer.
31We exclude the ﬁrst generation from this calculation because the ﬁrst generation does not have health
insurance by construction.
32Other surveys ﬁnd slightly larger numbers for the prevalence of high deductible health insurances (e.g.
www.eHealthinsurance.com).
205.1 The Economic Mechanism
The introduction of HSAs creates two opposing eﬀects on the accumulation of production
factors. HSAs provide a savings stimulus due to the tax shelter. Agents will save more in
physical capital. The increase in physical capital accumulation represents a positive eﬀect
on output. This savings eﬀect has been documented in the literature (e.g. see Imrohoroglu,
Imrohoroglu and Joines (1998)). In our general equilibrium framework this savings eﬀect will
lead to changes in aggregate capital, market wage rates and interest rates as well as incomes.
Changes in income trigger changes in household demands for health insurance and medical
services.
On the other hand, since HSAs have to be combined with a high deductible health insurance,
the implicit price of high deductible health insurances will decrease as HSAs become available on
a larger basis. Consequently, agents will start to switch from low deductible health insurances
to high deductible health insurances. In addition, previously uninsured agents can now buy
“subsidized” health insurance. As more and more agents buy high deductible health insurances,
the implicit price of health care services increases. This is only true for agents who previously
spent less than the high deductible on health care. Agents will respond to the higher implicit
price of health care services and buy less health care which decreases their health stock. If health
is associated with labor productivity (health is an investment good) as argued in Grossman
(1972b), the formation of human capital will be aﬀected. Depending on the productivity of
health in the formation of human capital, aggregate human capital decreases. We call this the
human capital eﬀect. It aﬀects output negatively.
Depending on the relative strength of these two eﬀects, we can either observe a decrease
or an increase in output, which translates into a decrease or an increase in household income.
If the income eﬀect is negative enough, some agents will decide to opt out of buying health
insurance and therefore demand fewer health services. Aggregate spending on health will then
decline. If, on the other hand, the income eﬀect is positive enough, more agents will start
buying health insurance and consequently demand more health services as documented in the
RAND Health Insurance Experiment (see Manning, Newhouse, Duan, Keeler, Leibowitz and
Marquis (1987)). As a result we can observe increases or decreases in total medical expenditure
as well as increases or decreases in the total number of insured individuals.
5.2 Contribution Limits and the Savings Eﬀect
There has been a lot of discussion whether HSAs could be misused for tax evasion. Policy
makers have therefore introduced an annual savings limit,   sm = $2.850 for an individual ($5,650
for a family). On the other hand, critics have questioned whether this savings limit is too low
and therefore does not allow agents to save enough for their health. In a general equilibrium
framework the annual contribution limit to HSAs is critical to determine the size of the savings
eﬀect, which in return inﬂuences the demand for health insurance and health care.
To isolate the savings eﬀect we shut down the human capital eﬀect and set θ = 0. Note that
when θ = 0 health is only a consumption good which does not aﬀect the accumulation of human
capital anymore. We calibrate the model to U.S. data for this parameter selection. In our policy
experiments we allow for annual savings limits in the range   sm ∈ [$2,680, $10,000]. We plot
the steady state results in ﬁgures 3. In addition, we overlay the graph with steady values from
the benchmark economy without HSAs.
The tax stimulus associating with HSAs induces households to save more. This positive
eﬀect on the accumulation of physical capital will increase output and therefore household
income. At the same time, agents purchase more high deductible health insurance which will
increase the eﬀective price of health care. However, the income eﬀect outweighs the price eﬀect,
21so that overall households will spend more on their health care after HSAs are introduced.
If we now gradually increase the annual contribution limit, output increases even further and
households spend more on their health care. Once the annual contribution limit reaches $5,500,
agents are not constrained by the savings limit anymore, so that further increases won’t change
the outcome anymore.
We conclude that HSAs can deliver only one out of two goals in this environment - where
we restrict health to be non-productive. That is, HSAs can increase the number of insured
people but they also increase total health expenditures in the economy. In addition, there are
additional costs associated with HSAs. Panel 8 shows that residual government expenditure G
drops oﬀ steadily as the annual savings limit increases. This is the eﬀect from lost government
revenue due to tax free savings. We can interpret this as the price the government has to pay
in order to increase the number of individuals with health insurance. A policy recommendation
would have to factor in how productive this government revenue is for the economy as a whole.
We run a revenue neutral experiment at the end of this section in order to partly address this
issue.
5.3 Health Productivity and the Human Capital Eﬀect
If one believes the argument that households only forego unnecessary treatment after buy-
ing high deductible health insurances (e.g. Manning et al. (1987), or Matisson (2002)), then
parameter θ in expression (2) should be close to zero. Choosing θ = 0 eﬀectively turns oﬀ
the inﬂuence of health in the formation of human capital. In this case health stops being an
investment good and is only replenished for its consumption value. Health then does not aﬀect
income or output via the production process anymore. If, on other hand, one believes in Gross-
man’s argument (Grossman (1972b)) that health is an investment good as it produces more
healthy work time, the formation of human capital will be aﬀected. The latter has important
consequences for output and household income.
In order to explore the eﬀect of health productivity systematically, we allow for positive
values of parameter θ. We report the results of introducing HSAs for θ = 0, 0.3, 0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8,
0.9, and 1 while ﬁxing the contribution limit to HSAs at the current threshold,   sm = $2,850,
in ﬁgure 4.
Panel one of ﬁgure 4 reports the eﬀects on the intensive margin, that is the change in total
health service expenditures due to the introduction of HSAs. When health is productive (θ close
to one), negative income eﬀects from lower health states add to the decrease in health service
expenditures. The direct price eﬀect from the high deductible insurance which makes health
services relatively more expensive works in the same direction. Partial equilibrium results are
very close to the general equilibrium results. If, on the other hand, health becomes more of a
consumption good, the negative income eﬀects are diminished and households spend more on
their health than in the benchmark economy. We now observe large diﬀerences between partial-
and general equilibrium outcomes because price eﬀects become the important distinguishing
feature.
We plot the change in the percentage of insured workers between the benchmark economy
and the economy with HSAs in panel two of ﬁgure 4. We call this the extensive margin. We see
that as long as health capital is an investment good, the introduction of HSAs has a negative
eﬀect on the number of insured workers. HSAs increase the relative price of medical services
to households. As households spend less on health services, their health capital deteriorates.
Since health is productive, households lose income. This negative income eﬀect dominates the
decline in premiums. As a result, households forgo buying insurance.
If, on the other hand, θ is small, health capital loses its investment good characteristic and
22turns into a consumption good. Households average health capital is still declining, but does
not carry the large negative income eﬀect. Since savings increase due to the tax deductibility of
savings in HSAs, physical capital drives up production in the economy. Households experience
a positive income eﬀect and more workers buy insurance. There is no substantial diﬀerence
between the partial equilibrium results and the general equilibrium results since the large
income eﬀects always dominate the price eﬀects.
Note also that only in the range of θ ∈ (0.5,0.8) can HSAs deliver on both goals, they
increase the number of insured and decrease total health expenditures. If θ is outside of this
range, only one of the two goals can be achieved.
5.4 Contribution Limits and the Savings Eﬀect: Revisited
We next investigate the role of the contribution limits when health is being productive. We
choose θ = 1 so that health is not only a consumption good but also an investment good.
We calibrate the model to U.S. data for this parameter selection. In our policy experiments
we again allow annual savings limits in the range between   sm ∈ [$2,680, $10,000] and report
steady state results in ﬁgure 5
The savings eﬀect is diﬀerent when health is productive. The biggest contrast to the earlier
discussion (where health was not productive) is that now aggregate health expenditures and
the number of insured individuals will decrease after introducing HSAs. Only when the annual
contribution limit is beyond $5,450 will the number of insured individuals increase as well. If
the annual contribution limit is between $5,450 and $8,000, then HSAs increase the number of
the insured population and decrease total health expenditures (see panel 1 and 2 in ﬁgure 5). If
the annual savings limit is larger than $8,000 then the physical capital accumulation dominates
the drop in human capital and output increases. This will make households richer and as a
consequence they spend more on health care. HSAs then lose their cost savings feature.
On the other hand, panel 8 shows that residual government expenditure G drops oﬀ steadily
as the annual savings limit increases. Again, this is the eﬀect from lost government revenue due
to tax free savings and represents the price tag the government faces when it wants to insure
more people and decrease health care spending.
We conclude that with the current annual contribution limit in place (  sm = $2,850), HSAs
can decrease total health expenditures in this economy. However, this eﬀect is “paid for” with
a larger number of uninsured individuals and lower government revenue. Sensitivity analysis
suggests that these results are robust to changes in the yearly contribution limits to HSAs. The
fraction of individuals with health insurance increases only if the annual contribution limit is
almost doubled to $5,450.
5.5 Taxpayer Liability from Health Savings Accounts
In order to determine the cost of HSAs for tax payers, we run the following experiment. We
introduce HSAs into the benchmark economy, holding government spending (in levels) con-
stant. We do this by introducing a lump sum tax on all surviving households that balances
the government budget constraint in reaction to the introduction of HSAs. We ﬁnd that if the
government were to hold its spending constant, then the introduction of HSAs requires addi-
tional tax revenues of 3% of GDP (raised by this lump sum tax on all surviving households).
When running this experiment we used a health productivity of θ = 1, which is our upper
limit for health productivity and produces the strongest adverse eﬀect on output. We therefore
conclude that the 3% of GDP “cost” estimate of HSA is also an upper limit.
236 Conclusion
Our model demonstrates that general equilibrium eﬀects from health productivity and the
annual contribution limit to HSAs are key components in determining the success or failure of
HSAs. As HSAs are introduced and high deductible health insurances become more attractive,
households shift from low to high deductible insurances. This increases the eﬀective price
of health services for a large number of households which in turn lowers demand for health
services. Health capital drops as a consequence and depending on the productivity of health
we observe a drop in human capital. The tax free savings via HSAs increases physical capital,
so that the net eﬀect of lower human capital and higher physical capital determines whether
output increases or decreases. Depending on this income eﬀect, households can go either way
and buy more or less health insurance. The success of HSAs in decreasing aggregate health
expenditures and increasing the number of individuals with health insurance depends critically
on the productivity of health capital and on the annual contribution limit to HSAs. We provide
extensive sensitivity analysis to address both issues.
The eﬀects on the wealth distribution are moderate but the eﬀect on the government size are
large. After the introduction of HSAs, government revenue drops so that government size (the
residual tax revenue after deduction of transfers from the social insurance program) decreases
signiﬁcantly. This raises the question whether HSAs are the most eﬃcient way to curb increases
in health expenditures and insure more people as one may suspect that the lost government
revenue leads to productivity losses in other sectors (e.g. less funding for public education,
infrastructure, etc.). We estimate that the cost of introducing HSAs can run up to 3% of GDP.
How balanced is our assessment of the performance of HSAs? There are a few features
that are omitted from the model that we think would weaken the case of HSAs. Among the
most prominent features that we did not include are (i) adjustment costs to learn the new
savings plan (e.g. in the model all consumers immediately understand all aspects of HSAs),
(ii) no ﬁxed fees of running insurance companies and HSAs33, and (iii) no alternative savings
vehicles are available in the benchmark model (e.g. absence of FSAs, HRAs, IRAs, and 401k’s).
Since our analysis concentrates on long run equilibria, adjustment costs play a minor role.
However, it would be of interest to include ﬁxed costs in running HSAs and alternative tax
sheltered savings vehicles since both will aﬀect the take up rate of high deductible insurances
and the net increase in aggregate savings. Further extensions would encompass solutions for
transition paths between the policy regimes in order to study welfare. Another interesting
question concerns recent increases in health care productivity. A fully endogenized health care
production sector would be able to address this issue. We leave this for future research.
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Figure 1: Panel (1): Conditional Survival Probabilities from U.S. Life-Tables 2003. Panel (2):
Premium Markup per Age Group. Source: 2005 Data from www.ehealthinsurance.com. Panel
(3): Income Tax Function Approximation.
29Parameters: Explanation/Source: Free Paras
- Periods working J1= 5
- Periods retired J2= 3
- Population growth rate n = 2.5%
to match > 65 at 12.4%
of population (n = 1.2%
in U.S. Census 2006)
- Years modeled years = 72 from age 20 to 92
- Relative risk aversion σ = 1.5 to match K
Y and R 1








- Discount factor β = 1.025(72/8) to match K
Y and R 1












δhmin= 1 − 0.80(years/J)
=0.8658





- Human capital production χ = 0.85 to match income distribution 1
- Health productivity θ =[0,1] used for sensitivity analysis 1
- Human capital proﬁle
 





- Insurance premium growth
{ˆ x0, ˆ x1, ˆ x2}=
{0.7781,0.0036,0.0007}
www.eHealthInsurance.com
- Price for medical care
for insured
pm,Ins= 1.3891 U.S. Census 2004
- Price for medical care
for uninsured
pm,nIns= 2.2226 U.S. Census 2004
- Capital share in production α = 0.33 standard value
- Capital depreciation δ = 1 − 0.9(years/J)= 0.6126
Kydland and Prescott (1982)
Nadiri and Prucha (1996)
- Total factor productivity A = 4 normalization
- Health Shocks see table 3 19
- Asset grid aGrid= [0,...,24]1×80
- HSA asset grid am
Grid=[0,...,8]1×14
- Health grid hjGrid=[0.01,...,6]1×16
- State space 1,881,600




- Pension replacement rate Ψ = 0.21 to match τsoc= 10% 1
- Payroll tax Medicare: τMed= 4%
- By law this is is 2.92%.
Need to pick higher rate,
so that workers
in last period buy
Medicare Plan B, and
pMed< p.
1
- Low deductible ρ = 0.15
- to match percentage of
insured to be close to 80%
1
- High deductible ρ′= 1.15
- to match
ρ
ρ′ = 0.13 according to
Fronstin and Collins (2006)
- Medicare deductible ρMed= 0.46
- to match
ρ
ρMed = 0.28 according to
Fronstin and Collins (2006)
and the U.S. Department of Health
- Coinsurance rate, low deductible γ = 0.25 0.25 in Suen (2006)
- Coinsurance rate, high deductible γ′= 0.20 to match insurance take-up rate 1
- Coinsurance rate, Medicare γMed= 0.25
- Center for Medicare and
Medicaid Services (2005)
- Saving limit markup v = 0.2232
- Revenue procdure 2006-53 and
Fronstin and Collins (2006)
- Maximum contribution to HSAs   sm= $2,850
- Revenue procdure 2006-53 and
Fronstin and Collins (2006)
-Total number of free parameters
incl. table 1
46
Table 2: Policy Parameters for Calibration
Shock 1 Shock 2 Shock 3 Shock 4 Shock 5
Age
20-28: 0.00 0.00 -0.02 -0.04 -0.10
29-38: 0.00 0.00 -0.02 -0.34 -1.60
39-47: 0.00 0.00 -0.02 -0.04 -3.25
48-56: 0.00 0.00 -0.02 -0.04 -4.20
57-65: 0.00 0.00 -0.02 -0.14 -4.83
66-74: 0.00 -0.05 -0.20 -0.40 -5.00
75-83: 0.00 -0.05 -0.20 -0.40 -5.00
84-92: 0.00 -0.05 -0.20 -0.40 -6.00
Table 3: Health shocks per age group. Health shocks account for 20 separate free parameters.
We use identiﬁcation restrictions on some of the shocks. Shocks 1,2, and 3 do not change over
age for all workers. In addition, Shocks 1,2, 3, and 4 also do not change over age for all retirees.
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Table 4: Distribution of Health Expenditures in the U.S. Economy. Data is from MEPS 2002
as summarized in Yu and Ezzati-Rice (2005).
Gini 1. Quintile 2. Quintile 3. Quintile 4. Quintile 5. Quintile
Wealth:
Data 1992 0.780 -0.390 1.740 5.720 13.430 79.490
Data 1998 0.803 -0.300 1.300 5.000 12.200 81.700
Model 0.728 0.000 0.000 0.810 17.108 82.082
Income:
Data 1998 0.553 2.400 7.200 12.500 20.000 58.000
Model 0.430 3.923 8.094 19.089 29.044 39.850
Table 5: Distribution of Wealth in the U.S. Economy (%). 1992 Data from Diaz-Gimenez,
Quadrini and Rios-Rull (1997) and 1998 data from Budria-Rodriguez et al. (2002).
32Parameters Model Data Source Nr. of Moments





Fang and Gavazza (2007)
1
- Fraction of insured workers:
(private insurance)
53%
- 86.1% of <65:
private 69% (employment
based 59.8%) public: 19%
- MEPS 2005 and
U.S. Census Bureay 2006
1
- Fraction of insured workers:
(private insurance, not counting
uninsured in ﬁrst generation)
76.55%
- 86.1% of <65:
private 69% (employment
based 59.8%) public: 19%
- MEPS 2005 and
U.S. Census Bureay 2006
1
- Fraction of insured retirees: 99.7% 99.7% MEPS 2005 1
- Low deductible insurance (of all insured) 95.4% 90% Fronstin and Collins (2006) 1
- High deductible insurance (of all insured) 4.6% 10% Fronstin and Collins (2006) 1







0.72 0.6 to 1.2
- Fronstin and Collins (2006)
and Claxton et al. (2006)
1
- Ratio of low deductible vs.
Medicare premium:
￿
j  jpj ￿
j  jpMed
j
1.22 0.13 to 3.86
- Fronstin and Collins (2006),
Claxton et al. (2006), and
U.S. Department of Health 2006
1






0.12 0.07 to 0.23
- Fronstin and Collins (2006),
Claxton et al. (2006) and
U.S. Census 2005
1
Ratio deductible vs. average premium
- Low deductible plan:
ρ ￿
j  jpj
0.17 0.07 to 0.23
- Fronstin and Collins (2006),
Claxton et al. (2006), and













0.74 1 U.S. Department of Health 2006 1
Ratio deductible vs. median income


















U.S. Department of Health 2006
and U.S. Census 2005
1
- Capital output ratio: K/Y 2.7 3 NIPA 1
- Interest rate: R 4.6% 4% NIPA 1
- Residual Government spending: G/Y 20.3% 20.2% Castaneda et al. (2003) 1
- Size of Social Security: SocSec/Y 6.3% 5% Social Security Administration 2002 1
- Size of Medicare: Medicare/Y 4.4% 2.5% U.S. Department of Health 2002 1
- Fraction over 65 13.97% 12.4% U.S. Census 2005
- Payroll tax Social Security: τSoc
10.2% 6%-10% IRS 34 and 1
- Gini Wealth 0.73 0.8 Budria-Rodriguez et al. (2002) 1
- Gini Income 0.43 0.55 Budria-Rodriguez et al. (2002) 1
- Income and savings proﬁle see ﬁgure 2 13
- Insurance take-up ratios see ﬁgure 2 10
Total number of Moments 46
Table 6: Data vs. Model








































Figure 2: [1] Benchmark Model: 2 Insurances and no HSAs. Panel (1): Health Insurance
Coverage of the Civilian Noninsititutionalized Population in the U.S. 2005. Source: MEPS
2005. Panel (2): Human Capital Proﬁle and Income Data per Age Cohort. Source: U.S.
Census 2006, CPS. Panel (3): Wealth Age Distribution. Source: Data U.S. Census 2000.
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Figure 3: Contribution Limits and the Savings Eﬀect. We ﬁx health productivity
parameter θ = 0 and then vary the annual contribution limit to HSAs, according to
sm = {$2,680; $2,850; ...;$1000} and compare the results to the benchmark economy
[1 Benchmark] with no HSAs.

































































































Figure 4: Health Productivity and the Human Capital Eﬀect. We vary the health productivity
parameter θ according to θ = {0, 0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9, 1} and compare the General Equi-
librium with HSAs result and the Partial Equilibrium with HSAs result to the benchmark
economy [1 Benchmark] with no HSAs.
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Figure 5: Contribution Limits and the Savings Eﬀect: Revisited. We ﬁx the health pro-
ductivity parameter θ = 1 and then vary the annual contribution limit to HSAs, according
to   am = {$2,680; $2,850; ...;10,000} and compare the results to the benchmark economy
[1 Benchmark] with no HSAs.
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